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1  Introduction
Democracy rests on a dilemma: On the one hand, as Downs (1957) noted, voters have
low incentives to inform themselves on political issues. As an individual vote is most
unlikely to change the overall outcome at the ballots, voters will not only tend to abstain
from an election or a vote, but also remain ’rationally ignorant‘ about the alternatives to
decide on. On the other hand, it is widely believed that well informed citizens are an
essential prerequisite for a well functioning and stable democracy. If citizens do not
have sufficient information about the policies or governments they vote for, they may
be disappointed by the actual consequences of their decisions, which in turn can
undermine the acceptance and legitimacy of democracy as a political system.
Public choice scholars have indicated several ways out of this dilemma. It has been
argued that in reality, a variety of institutions exist that lower citizens’ information
costs. Perhaps most importantly, voters can use party ideologies to proxy for the ‘true’
consequences of their vote. But they also use other information ‘shortcuts’. Citizens pay
attention to the past performance of a government (for a survey on vote and popularity
functions, see Nannestad and Paldam 1994); they judge the reputation of candidates
(Lupia and McCubbins 1998, Popkin 1991); they evaluate voting recommendations by
interest groups (Schneider 1985, Lupia 1994, Bowler and Donovan 1998, Christin et al.
2002); or they collect political information as a by-product of mass media consumption.
In one way or another, all these approaches analyze how information costs are reduced
within a given political system.
In this paper, we attempt to analyze the relationship between information and
democracy from a somewhat different angle. We empirically test whether the level of
voter information itself is dependent on the political system under which citizens live.
The idea that voters’ awareness of political issues should be treated as endogenously
determined by political institutions has been advanced by several authors (e.g. Cronin
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1989, Bohnet and Frey 1994, Frey 1994 and Kirchgässner, Feld and Savioz 1999).1
They theoretically argue that a political system that gives citizens more political
participation possibilities will change the demand for political information as well as the
supply of it. As an illustrative example, the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty in
various European countries is used. In the countries where citizens had the right to vote
on it (e.g. Denmark), politicians had to engage much more in explaining the Treaty to
the citizens than in countries where no referendum took place (e.g. Germany). For the
citizens, on the other hand, the incentives to be informed were greater, as the intense
discussions before the referendum transformed the fact of ‘having a reasoned opinion’
partly into a private good. Casual observation suggests that, as a consequence,
information levels on the content of the Treaty were high among Danish citizens. This
and other examples offer suggestive evidence that voters are better informed when they
have a larger say in the political process; however, there is a lack of more systematic
evidence in the literature. In this paper, we conduct an empirical investigation in an
attempt to partly fill this gap.
We study voter information in two contexts. First, survey data from the Eurobarometer
series is used to systematically investigate how referenda in several European countries
affected citizens’ information on the European Union (EU). The results indicate that
people in countries with a referendum are in fact “objectively” better informed
(according to ten questions about the EU in the 1996 Eurobarometer) as well as they
feel “subjectively” better informed about the EU after a referendum (Eurobarometer
1992 – 1997). As a second empirical test, we look at voter information in Switzerland,
where the extent of citizens’ political participation rights differs substantially among the
26 Swiss cantons. This unique institutional variation can be used to explain differences
in voter information obtained from a large survey conducted among the Swiss electorate
in 1996. Again, we find that citizens living in more direct democratic jurisdictions are
                                                           
1 Advocates of direct or participatory democracy have argued for years that more ‘self-governance’ would
increase citizens’ competence and interest in communal life (e.g. Barber 1984, Mansbridge 1983 and
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objectively better informed about politics. The results also indicate that political
participation possibilities raise discussion intensity, which in the literature is seen as an
important transmission channel that leads to higher voter information.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical
arguments on how voter information is shaped by political institutions, especially the
political participation rights of the citizens. Section 3 presents the data. The empirical
analysis for the EU is provided in section 4; the one for Switzerland in section 5.
Concluding remarks are offered in section 6.
2 Voter Information and Political Institutions
Political institutions influence voter information in a variety of ways. In representative
democracies, the institutional structures usually favor the emergence of a small number
of parties (often two). One essential role of political parties can be seen in reducing the
voters’ information costs (Downs 1957, 93 ff.). By having an ideological position which
voters can focus on, parties serve to reduce complexity: voters can choose between a
few parties and need not be well informed about the whole range of policies the parties
propose to pursue. In representative democracies, a variety of other information saving
mechanisms exist, as already mentioned in the introduction. Representative
democracies, however, are just one form of political system in the possible range from
autocracies to fully direct democracies. An essential feature of political institutions is to
what degree they allow citizens to directly participate in the political process, i.e.
whether citizens are just allowed to vote in elections (if at all) or whether they also have
the possibility to vote on particular issues. This paper focuses on a comparison of
political systems that grant citizens relatively few direct participation rights
                                                                                                                                                                             
Pateman 1970).
2 This analysis might inform proponents of deliberative democracy (e.g. Dryzek 1990, Fishkin 1991) who
seek an institutional environment for an open political discourse.
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(representative democracies) with political systems that give citizens more direct
participation possibilities in the form of referenda and initiatives (direct democracies).
From a theoretical point of view, voter information will be of different size and quality
in more direct democracies because of changes in the supply of political information
and the demand for it (see e.g. Eichenberger 1999, Frey 1994, Kirchgässner, Feld and
Savioz 1999). On the supply side, the possibility for voters to decide on single issues via
initiatives and referenda provides incentives for potential information suppliers like the
government, political parties, and especially interest groups. If they want to win a
referendum, they are forced to inform the public about the reasons why they are for or
against a particular policy. Thereby, it is often not enough to emphasize an ideological
position, but specific information on the issue at stake has to be provided, and the
arguments and information of the opponents have to be taken up and discussed. This
results in a discussion process, which frequently involves politicians and citizens,
usually much more often than every four years when elections take place. The political
information supplied in more direct democracies will not only be quantitatively larger,
but also qualitatively different. Compared to elections, referenda are less personalized,
which favors the supply of issue related information. Moreover, it restricts the
possibility of politicians to hide behind an image or a reputation which in representative
democracies might secure them reelection. In a referendum campaign, politicians are
repeatedly forced to explain their arguments for or against a concrete policy measure
and cannot focus on one or two core aspects of their party program (which are often
rather unspecific, like ’improving the health care system’).
On the demand side, citizens ask for more political information mainly because they
frequently are involved in the (often intense) discussions taking place before a
referendum. Although being informed remains largely a public good also in more direct
democracies, the discussion process nevertheless creates some substantial private
incentives that increase the demand for information. In discussions, “having an opinion”
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is partly transformed into a private good, for two reasons. First, individuals consider it
as a value per se to have an opinion (Hirschman 1989). Second, not having a certain
level of information excludes an individual from discussions, or is viewed negatively by
others. This is especially the case when important political issues are to be decided and
thus discussions are intense. An example is the referendum on whether Switzerland
should join the European Economic Area in 1992. In the weeks preceding the vote, it
was almost impossible not to get involved in the fierce discussions on the subject, and
consequently, the incentives to be informed were high. Evidence shows that Swiss
citizens were actually better informed about the EEA and the EU after the referendum
than citizens of neighboring countries already belonging to the EU (Eurobarometer
Schweiz 1991, cit. in Bohnet and Frey 1994: 345).
The theoretical arguments concerning the supply and demand of political information
suggest that voters will be politically better aware of political issues when they have
larger direct participation possibilities in the political process. This is, however, not to
say that voters are always perfectly informed. One of the core arguments against direct
democracy has always been that voters are not informed well enough to make decisions
on single issues. The argument is still debated. There exists a number of well founded
skepticisms, but also a variety of good arguments that even relatively low levels of voter
information are sufficient for direct democratic decisions (see e.g. Lupia 2001 for a
survey of the arguments). In any case, this paper is not concerned about the absolute
level of voter competence and whether it is ‘high enough’. Rather, a comparative
institutional view is applied. In the following empirical section, we attempt to test the
hypothesis that voters are relatively better informed when they live in more direct
democracies.
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3 Data
The empirical analysis is conducted in two parts. First, voter information in EU
countries is studied, and second, political information levels in Switzerland are
investigated. We discuss the data sets used in turn.
3.1. European Union
Data on voter information in the EU countries are obtained from the regularly
conducted Eurobarometer series. The database allows assessing voters’ information
about political issues in two different ways. First, there is cross-section evidence on
voters’ “objective” information about the EU. In the so-called “mega-survey” conducted
in 1996 (Reif and Marlier 1996), about 65’000 persons living in 15 EU-countries were
asked questions on their knowledge about the EU. The ten questions asked are: “Do you
happen to know… (i) the current number of states in the EU, (ii) the name of the
president of the European Commission, (iii) the number of commissioners of your
country, (iv) the name of one commissioner, (v) the recently chosen name for the
European currency, (vi) the country which holds the Presidency of the EU since January
1 and until end of June 1996, (vii) the current value of the ECU in your national
currency, (viii) the city in which most of the EU institutions are located, (ix) one of the
two colors of the European flag, and (x) the year when notes and coins in the European
currency will be introduced?”3
Are these questions well suited to assess voter information? Clearly, the answers do not
directly measure the political information citizens have, for example, on a specific
referendum issue like the Maastricht Treaty. One might even argue that this kind of
information is simply not important, because it is concerned with factual knowledge that
might not help to make more competent direct democratic decisions. We agree that the
                                                           
3 The correct answers were: (i) 15, (ii) Jacques Santer, (iii) two in the case of D,E,F,IT,UK and one in the
case of all other countries, (iv) at least one correct name of a commissioner, (v) Euro, (vi) Italy, (vii)
between 1 and 2, (viii) Brussels or Luxembourg, (ix) yellow/gold or blue, and (x) 2002.
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answers to these questions per se are rather unimportant. Still, they can be seen as good
proxy measures for the awareness of political issues and the ’true‘ political information
levels of citizens. All the questions relate to basic characteristics of the EU, and it seems
very likely that they correlate with the general political information of individuals.
The answers to the ten questions are used to construct an index of “objective” political
information about the EU. The index counts every correct answer as one index point,
i.e. the maximum value of the index is ten (if all questions were answered correctly) and
the minimum value is zero. Every “don’t know” answer is counted as a “wrong”
answer. The resulting index serves as the dependent variable for the analysis of
referenda’s effect on the objective information citizens have on the EU. On average, the
Europeans surveyed answered 3.42 questions out of 10 correctly (std. dev. 2.44).
In order to also conduct a longitudinal analysis of voter information in European
countries, we use several waves of the Eurobarometer from 1992 to 1997 as a second
data source (Scholz and Schmitt 2001). Each of the in total eight Eurobarometer waves4
available contains a standard question on the “subjective” political information level of
an individual. The question asked is: “All things considered, how well informed do you
feel you are about the EU, its policies, its institutions?” Answers can be given on a scale
from (1) very well, (2) quite well, (3) not very well, to (4) not at all well. We recoded
answers so that a high value of 4 means “very well” informed and a low value of 1
means “not at all well” informed. The resulting variable is used as the dependent
variable in the analysis of a referendum’s effect on the citizens’ subjective political
information levels over time. On average, the over 120’000 European citizens surveyed
from 1992-1997 felt “not very well informed” about the EU, as indicated by the mean
value of 2.14 on a scale from 1 to 4 (st.d. 0.77).
                                                           
4 The eight waves used are the EB 37.0 (conducted in March-April 1992), EB 38.0 (Sept.-Oct. 1992), EB
40 (Oct.-Nov. 1993), EB 41.0 (March-May 1994), EB 42 (Nov.-Dec. 1994), EB 43.1 (Apr.-May 1995),
EB 46.0 (Oct.-Nov. 1996), and EB 47.1 (March-Apr. 1997).
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As the main explanatory variable, we are interested in referenda about the EU. Do they
affect citizens’ political information in the respective countries? In the period
considered, referenda were held in Denmark (2.6.1992 and 18.5.1993), Ireland
(18.6.1992), France (20.9.1992), Austria (12.6.1994), Sweden (13.10.1994), Finland
(16.10.1994) and Norway (28.11.1994). This information on referenda is used in two
different ways. For the cross-sectional analysis on objective voter information in 1996,
a dummy variable “referendum” is created that is equal to 1 if a referendum has taken
place before 1996 in a country, and 0 otherwise.5 For the longitudinal analysis on
subjective voter information from 1992 to 1997, dummy variables are created for each
country that are equal to 1 for the observations included in the Eurobarometer wave
right following a referendum. For example, in the case of Ireland where the referendum
took place in June 1992, the dummy “referendum IRL” takes on the value 1 for all Irish
surveyed in the second Eurobarometer wave conducted in September and October 1992,
and 0 for those surveyed in the wave conducted before and the waves conducted after
the referendum. Thus, in the longitudinal analysis, the dummy variables capture the
short term effects of a referendum on the citizens’ subjective information levels in a
country.6
The Eurobarometer surveys also contain information on individual characteristics that
have been shown to influence peoples’ political information levels (see the next
subsection for a theoretical discussion). As control variables, we include education (4
categories), income (12 categories), age (6 categories), gender, civil status (6 categories)
and the type of communitiy individuals live in (3 categories) in the analysis. The
                                                           
5 Norway is not included in the 1996 survey; i.e. the dummy variable used in the cross-section analysis on
objective voter information includes the other six countries with a referendum only.
6 The study of long-term effects is hampered, unfortunately, by data restrictions. Norway, Sweden and
Austria are only included in the Eurobarometer surveys after their referendum on the EU (from 1995 on),
and thus a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for all waves following a referendum would amount to a
country fixed effect in these cases. Moreover, the question on subjective political information is not
available before 1992, leaving only one wave of observations before a referedum in the case of Denmark,
Ireland and France.
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Eurobarometer surveys provide information on these control variables that is made
comparable across the countries surveyed.
3.2. Switzerland
The empirical analysis for Switzerland is based on a survey conducted by political
scientists after the general national elections in 1995 (‘SELECTS 1996‘, Delagrande et
al. 1995). The database is well suited for our purposes because it allows assessing
voters’ objective information about political issues. The survey includes three questions
about fundamental characteristics of the Swiss political system; such questions are
rarely asked in surveys because of their examinatory character. The survey contains
roughly 7,500 observations and information on important control variables.
Respondents had to answer the following three questions: (i) “How many parties are in
the Federal Council?” (ii) “Who was the president of the Federal Council in 1995?”
And (iii) “How many signatures are required for an initiative?” Responses to these
questions can clearly be assigned to the three categories ‘right answer’, ‘wrong answer’
and ‘refused to answer’.7
Again, these questions do not directly measure the political information citizens have,
for example, on a specific referendum issue. However, they can be seen as good proxy
measures for citizens’ awareness of political issues. All the questions relate to basic
characteristics of the Swiss political system. A look at the descriptive statistics shows
that there is enough variation for a positive correlation to be possible: by far not every
citizen knows all the answers to the questions (the average score of correct answers is
1.41), and there is substantial variation (std. dev. 1.03). Only about 18 % of the
respondents answer all the questions correctly; 29 % have two correct answers, 29 %
one correct answer, and 24 % do not give any correct answer or do not answer any
questions at all.
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The answers to the three questions are used to construct an index of political
information for Switzerland similar to the one for the EU. The index counts every
correct answer as one index point, i.e. the maximum value of the index is three (if all
questions were answered correctly) and the minimum value is zero. Every “refused
answer” is counted as a “wrong answer”. This procedure is chosen because a large
number of respondents (38 %) refuses to answer at least one of the three questions. Not
answering a question can be seen as a relatively cheap way of avoiding a wrong answer.
Thus, it seems unproblematic to combine ‘refused answers’ and ‘wrong answers’ into a
single category.8 The resulting index on political information serves as the dependent
variable for the analysis on voter information in Switzerland.
The main factor that is put forward to explain citizens’ information levels are
institutions of direct democracy. In Switzerland, direct democratic institutions exist on
the federal as well as on the state level (the 26 Swiss cantons). As the federal
institutions apply equally to all Swiss citizens, an empirical analysis cannot identify the
level effect that these federal institutions of direct democracy have on citizens’
information. Instead, the empirical analysis has to be concerned with the variation
around the average information level (that is formed by Swiss federal institutions). We
therefore use the institutional variation across the 26 Swiss cantons as the main
explanatory variable. This will provide a lower bound for the effects of institutions on
voter information, because only cantonal institutional variation is exploited. However,
the extent of political participation possibilities differs substantially for citizens living in
different cantons. Some cantons can be characterized as more representative democratic,
whereas others are more direct democratic. We use an index developed by Stutzer
(1999) that measures the degree of political participation possibilities in a canton on a
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 The correct answers were: (i) there are four parties in the Federal Council; (ii) the president of the
Federal Council in 1995 was Kaspar Villiger; and (iii) the number of signatures required for an initiative
is 100,000.
8 However, the results are not sensitive to this choice and remain qualitatively similar when only the
questions answered are included in the index (but, of course, information on 38 % of all the observations
is not taken into account); see section 4.2.
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scale between one and six.9 The highest value of the democracy index is observed for
canton Basle Land (5.69), and the lowest direct participation rights are to be found in
canton Geneva (1.75). For all cantons, the index averages 4.22 points (std. dev. 1.24).
The index has been applied in a series of other papers, e.g. Frey and Stutzer (2000),
Küttel and Kugler (2001), Schaltegger and Feld (2001). Here, the degree of direct
political participation possibilities is used to explain the differences in information
levels observed among Swiss citizens.
The survey provides information on other characteristics that political economists have
identified as important determinants of voter information. Individuals state their
educational level (8 categories) and their gross household income (11 categories); for
both variables, voter information is likely to increase. Moreover, information can be
expected to be less costly to individuals when they are members of a political party, or
when they are married or living with a partner (for theoretical arguments supporting
these predictions see Matsusaka 1995).10 There is no clear prediction for naturalized
citizens versus native citizens. While the latter have grown up with political rights,
naturalized citizens learn a lot about political institutions during the naturalization
process. Apart from these variables, the survey includes information on age, gender, and
place of residence of individuals (city, agglomeration or countryside). We complement
the data set with information on the population size of the cantons individuals live in.
The effects of population size are not unambiguous from a theoretical viewpoint:
information might be higher in small cantons, because social interaction is more intense.
                                                           
9 The index measures the different barriers for the citizens to enter the political process via initiatives and
referenda across cantons. It is based on the four main legal instruments to directly influence the political
process in Swiss cantons: (i) the initiative to change a canton’s constitution, (ii) the initiative to change a
canton’s laws, (iii) the compulsory or optional referendum to prevent new law or the changing of law and
(iv) the compulsory or optional referendum to prevent new state expenditure. Barriers are measured in
terms of (i) the number of signatures necessary to launch an instrument (absolute and relative to the
number of citizens with the right to vote), (ii) the legally allowed time span to collect the signatures and
(iii) the level of new expenditure per head allowing a financial referendum. Each of these restrictions is
evaluated on a six point scale: “one” indicates a high barrier, “six” a low one (compulsory referenda are
treated like referenda with the lowest possible barrier). The resulting non-weighted ratings represent the
measure used for direct democratic rights in Swiss cantons.
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On the other hand, individuals in large cantons might benefit from economies of scale in
information production. As socio-demographic characteristics and other control
variables are not available for all the individuals interviewed, the final sample for the
empirical test of institutional effects on voter information consists of 6,447 usable
observations.
In a second step, we also assess whether differences in participation possibilities affect
the intensity of political discussions among citizens. Here, the dependent variable
consists of the individual answers to the question: “Did you discuss with other people
which party or candidates to vote for?” Answers are coded ‘yes’ or ‘no’. However, in
this case, only individuals who actually voted in the general election were asked the
question. This reduces the sample size to 4016 observations. Note also that the question
relates to discussions about the general election, and not about an initiative or a
referendum. Nevertheless, we consider this dependent variable as a sufficient proxy
measure to present preliminary evidence on discussion intensity, which in the literature
is seen as the main transmission channel that leads to higher voter information in more
direct democracies.
4 Empirical Analysis for the European Union
4.1. Referenda and Objective Information about the EU
To get a first impression on the relationship between referenda and the objective
information citizens have about the EU, we present a “political information league
table” of the 15 EU-countries (table 1). The league table contains the ranking of
countries according to the average objective political information of their citizens. In
order to evaluate the country means ceteris paribus, we estimated an ordered probit
regression that includes the control variables presented in the last section (income,
education, age, gender, civil status, type of community). The regression is weighted to
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 A strict empirical test is hampered by potentially strong effects of selection.
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produce representative results for each country, and the estimated standard errors are
corrected to clustering of observations at the country level.11
Table 1: Referenda and Objective Information about the European Union:
A League Table of the 15 EU Countries in 1996
Dependent variable: “objective” voter information index (scale from 0 to 10)
Weighted ordered probit
Std. err. adjusted to clustering
of obs. in 15 countries
Variable Referendum on EU
before 1996
Coefficient z-value Marg. effect
(avg. over
all scores)
1.   Luxemburg N 0.986** 62.86 0.068
2.   Austria Y 0.817** 59.80 0.057
3.   Denmark Y 0.524** 30.68 0.037
4.   Finland Y 0.366** 33.70 0.026
5.   Germany N 0.271** 25.24 0.019
6.   Belgium N 0.222** 26.38 0.016
7.   Ireland Y 0.081** 6.34 0.006
8.   Sweden Y 0.058** 3.96 0.004
9.   Portugal N 0.056(*) 1.71 0.004
10. Italy N 0.021(*) 1.96 0.001
11. Netherlands N reference country
12. France Y -0.016* 2.52 -0.001
13. Greece N -0.038(*) 1.84 -0.003
14. Spain N -0.214** 10.33 -0.015
15. Great Britain N -0.496** 19.91 -0.035
Control variables yes
Observations 65’178
LR chi2 17’470.16
Prob > chi2 0.0000
Notes: The control variables not shown include education (4 categories), income (12 categories), age (6
categories), gender, civil status (6 categories) and type of community (4 categories). White estimator for
variance. Significance levels: (*) 0.05 < p < 0.10, * 0.01 < p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Data source: Eurobarometer 44.2bis, 1996.
                                                           
11 Ignoring the clustering in the estimation model is likely to produce downward biased standard errors,
due to the effects of aggregate variables on individual data (Moulton 1990). To get unbiased standard
errors for the aggregate country dummies, countries are used as sampling units.
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Table 1 provides first evidence in support of our hypothesis: Countries with referenda in
general score better than non-referenda country. With Austria, Denmark, Finland,
Sweden and Ireland, five out of six referenda countries rank in the upper half of the
league table. The only exception is France, who had a referendum on the Maastricht
Treaty, but only scores twelveth. With respect to non-referenda countries, Luxembourg,
Belgium and Germany make it into the first eight, whereas the remaining six non-
referenda countries are to be found in the bottom half of the distribution. The same
picture emerges if referenda countries as a group are compared to non-referenda
countries: Citizens in the six countries that allowed for a referendum on the Maastricht
Treaty answer on average 3.82 questions out of 10 correctly, compared to 3.21 in non-
referenda countries (p<0.01, two-sample t-test).
In table 2, the positive relationship between referenda and objective information is
investigated in more detail. The first column presents the results of a weighted ordered
probit regression that includes the dummy variable “referendum” which is equal to 1 for
the countries that had a referendum before 1996, and 0 otherwise. The regression also
controls for the effects of income, education, age and other determinants. In the second
column of table 2, we provide results from a different specification in which the
referenda countries are split up into three groups. A first group consists of Austria,
Finland, and Sweden, where the referenda took place shortly before the survey was
conducted (1994); a second group consists of Denmark, which had the last referendum
in 1993; and a third group consists of France and Ireland, where the Maastricht Treaty
was voted upon in 1992.
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Table 2: Referenda and Objective Information about the European Union:
Regression Results
Dependent variable: “objective” voter information index (scale from 0 to 10)
Weighted ordered probit
Std. err. adjusted to clustering
of obs. in 15 countries
(I) (II)
Variable Coef. z-value Marginal
effect
(avg. over
all scores)
Coef. z-value Marginal
effect
(avg. over
all scores)
Referendum 0.233 1.54 0.017
Referenda in A, FI,
SW 0.386* 2.01 0.028
Referenda in DK 0.515** 5.72 0.037
Referenda in F, IRL 0.010 0.11 0.001
Education levels (age at
the end of education)
- 15 ref. group ref. group
16-19 0.439** 7.60 0.031 0.440** 7.55 0.031
20 + 0.809** 11.75 0.056 0.775** 11.83 0.054
Still in education 0.811** 12.39 0.056 0.764** 12.10 0.053
Income categories
lowest ref. group ref. group
II 0.034 0.54 0.002 0.015 0.24 0.001
III 0.094 1.27 0.007 0.081 1.09 0.006
IV 0.171* 2.24 0.012 0.161* 2.04 0.012
V 0.217* 2.51 0.015 0.219* 2.54 0.015
VI 0.235** 2.66 0.017 0.236** 2.73 0.017
VII 0.253** 2.84 0.018 0.262** 3.07 0.018
VIII 0.284** 3.11 0.021 0.303** 3.43 0.022
IX 0.277** 3.47 0.020 0.309** 3.77 0.022
X 0.241** 3.04 0.017 0.277** 3.29 0.020
XI 0.329** 3.85 0.023 0.360** 4.12 0.026
Highest 0.432** 4.97 0.031 0.472** 5.22 0.034
income missing 0.281** 3.63 0.020 0.323** 4.20 0.023
Age
15 – 24 ref. group ref. group
25 – 34 0.239** 6.69 0.017 0.233** 6.39 0.016
35 – 44 0.335** 8.23 0.024 0.328** 7.77 0.023
45 – 54 0.426** 9.85 0.030 0.412** 9.31 0.029
55 – 64 0.465** 10.16 0.033 0.455** 9.77 0.033
65 + 0.364** 6.67 0.026 0.350** 6.62 0.025
Sex (1=male) 0.454** 15.87 0.032 0.456** 16.22 0.032
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Table 2 (continuation)
Civil Status
Single ref. group ref. group
Married -0.019 0.91 -0.001 -0.031 1.49 -0.002
Living with partner -0.126* 2.47 -0.008 -0.159** 4.80 -0.011
Divorced -0.050 1.01 -0.003 -0.064 1.17 -0.004
Separated -0.096** 3.57 -0.007 -0.058 1.69 -0.004
Widowed -0.159** 3.79 -0.011 -0.162** 3.87 -0.011
Type of community
Village ref. group ref. group
Small town 0.016 0.40 0.001 0.004 0.11 0.000
City 0.074 1.29 0.005 0.079 1.40 0.005
Observations 65’178 65’178
LR chi2 12’386.7 13’238.1
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: White estimator for variance. Significance levels: (*) 0.05 < p < 0.10, * 0.01 < p < 0.05, **
p < 0.01.
Data source: Eurobarometer 44.2bis, 1996.
The results in table 2 show that the positive effect of referenda on objective information
is an overall stable and sizeable result. The positive coefficient on the variable
“referendum” indicates that citizens in referenda countries are on average better
informed (however, the effect is at the border of statistical significance)12. The size of
the effect is considerable. As the coefficients in ordered probit regressions do not have
an intuitive interpretation, table 2 also provides marginal effects.13 For the variable
“referendum”, the marginal effect amounts to 1.7%, i.e. citizens in referenda countries
are 1.7% more likely to be better informed by one index point than otherwise similar
citizens in non-referenda countries. The effect is comparable to the difference in
political information between an individual in a middle income category and an
individual in the lowest income category. Table 2 further indicates that the overall
referendum effect mainly stems from the countries Austria, Finland, Sweden and
                                                           
12 If we include an additional dummy variable for the EU host countries Luxembourg and Belgium, the
coefficient on the referendum variable is significant at the 95%-level.
13 The marginal effect indicates the change in the probability that an individual is better informed by one
index point when the independent variable increases by one unit. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as an
increase in the share of persons that answer a given number of questions correctly. In the case of dummy
variables, the marginal effect is evaluated with respect to the reference group. The marginal effects
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Denmark, which held their referenda closer to the date when the survey was conducted.
In contrast, the citizens of France and Irleand, who voted on the Maastricht Treaty
already in 1992, are on average not better informed than people in non-referenda
countries. This indicates that the positive information effects of referenda fade over time
when they are a rare event.
It is also noteworthy that the regressions produce the theoretically expected results for
the control variables used. Information is strongly increasing in education, income, and
age, indicating that the dependent variable does not only capture random differences in
objective information about the EU.
The evidence presented in table 1 and 2 gives a first indication that citizens seem to be
better informed about the EU ceteris paribus when they had a possibility to vote on EU
issues. However, some alternative explanations might be put forward. For example, one
might argue that historical reasons account for the observed differences between
countries. The longer a country has been a member of the EU, the more have its citizens
been exposed to information about the EU. Similarly, one may hypothesize that the
involvement in EU institutions raises information levels. It is noteworthy, however, that
arguments along these lines would rather strengthen our point. On the one hand, the
citizens of Austria, Finland, and Sweden are found to be well informed about the EU
although these countries only joined in 1995. On the other hand, the involvement in EU
institutions might explain why also some non-referenda countries are found in the upper
half of the league table; indeed, the high ranking countries Luxembourg and Belgium
host most of the EU organizations.
4.2. Referenda and Subjective Information about the EU
In order to provide complementary evidence, this subsection studies the relationship
between referenda and information in a longitudinal setting. It is investigated how
                                                                                                                                                                             
provided in table 2 indicate the average probability change over all eleven scores of the voter information
index.
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referenda change the information levels of citizens over time, i.e. information levels
before and after a referendum are compared. As objective information is only available
in 1996, we use a measure of subjectively perceived information levels included in eight
Eurobarometer waves between 1992 and 1997 instead. For each of the countries that
had a referendum, it is studied how the average subjective information levels of citizens
changed in the survey wave subsequent to the referendum.
Table 3 contains the results of the longitudinal analysis of referenda’s effect on
information. Again, a weighted ordered probit regression is estimated that produces
representative results at the country level. The regression includes fixed effects for each
country to account for unobserved heterogeneity between countries, and time effects for
each Eurobarometer wave to capture potential changes in information levels common to
all EU citizens. Estimated standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations at
the country level. The effects of referenda are estimated using dummy variables for each
country and referendum: if a referendum has taken place in a country, all observations
of the subsequent survey wave in this country are given the value 1. In contrast to the
cross-section analysis, the regression does not include control variables. On the one
hand, the control variables are not available for each of the waves used. On the other
hand, the analysis focuses on the differential effect that a referendum has on the
population in a country, compared to citizens of other countries without a referendum at
that time. As the levels of income, education, and other characteristics do not rapidly
change from one survey wave to another, one can plausibly assume that the regression
produces unbiased results even when excluding these control variables.
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Table 3: Referenda and Subjectively Perceived Information Levels:
Results of a Longitudinal Analysis 1992 - 1997
Dependent variable: “subjective” voter information index (scale from 1 to 4)
Weighted ordered probit
Std. err. adjusted to clustering
of obs. in 16 countries
Variable Coefficient z-value Marginal
effect
(avg. over
all scores)
Referenda
Denmark 1992 0.086* 2.27 0.016
Denmark 1993 0.082* 2.26 0.015
France 1992 -0.048 1.13 -0.008
Irland 1992 0.086(*) 1.88 0.016
Austria 1994 0.302** 6.28 0.057
Sweden 1994 0.148** 3.75 0.027
Finland 1994 0.159** 4.14 0.029
Norway 1994 0.364** 8.66 0.069
Country fixed effects
(country dummies) yes
Time effects
(survey wave dummies) yes
Observations 120’225
LR chi2 4876.9
Prob > chi2 0.0000
Notes: White estimator for variance. Significance levels: (*) 0.05 < p < 0.10, *
0.01 < p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Data source: Eurobarometer 1992 – 1997, eight waves (see data section).
Table 3 shows that for almost every referendum held in European countries between
1992 and 1997, a positive effect on citizens’ perceived information levels can be
identified. With the exception of the referendum held in France in 1992, citizens find
themselves in every case better informed about the EU, its institutions, and its policies
after they were given the possibility to vote on a EU issue. The estimated coefficients
are in general significant and of considerable magnitude. The marginal effects indicated
in table 3 range from 1.6% in the case of the two Danish and the Irish referendum up to
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6.9% for the Norwegian referendum. Thus, referenda contribute to a significant extent
to the information citizens feel they have about the EU. Although this result is reached
using subjectively reported levels of information as the dependent variable, it
corresponds well to the finding that citizens in referenda countries are also objectively
better informed about the EU.
5 Empirical Analysis for Switzerland
5.1. Institutional Effects on Voter Information in Switzerland
To provide further evidence on the relationship between political participation
possibilities and voter information, we focus on a second institutional context and
investigate political information in Switzerland. Switzerland is especially suited for our
analysis because unique institutional variation exists: as described in the data section,
there are considerable differences with respect to democratic participation rights
between the 26 Swiss cantons. We hypothesize that the extent of direct democracy in a
canton positively correlates with a measure on voter information we obtain from a large
survey conducted in 1995.
To get an intuition of the relationship between political participation possibilities and
voter information, results are first presented graphically. Figure 1 plots the average
information level of citizens living in a canton against the index of political
participation possibilities (see next page). As can be seen, the raw data clearly indicate a
positive correlation.
This raw relationship could, of course, be due to third factors that are correlated both
with institutionalized participation rights and with voter information. For example, it
might be that voter information is higher in small cantons, and small cantons are at the
same time more direct democratic. In a multiple regression analysis, such alternative
explanations can be controlled for. In table 4, we present the main results from a
multiple regression analysis that includes all the control variables presented in the data
section. A weighted ordered probit model is used in order to exploit the ranking
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Extent of political participation rights in canton
1 2 3 4 5 6
1
1.25
1.5
1.75
2
Data source: Selects 1996.
Figure 1: Correlation between Voter Information and Political Participation
Rights in Swiss Cantons, 1995.
information contained in the scaled dependent variable. The weighting variable that is
applied allows representative results on the individual level for Switzerland. Moreover,
the estimated standard errors are adjusted to clustering of observations at the cantonal
level. This is necessary because individual data are combined with data that are
aggregated for the 26 cantons.
Table 4: Political Participation Possibilities and Voter Information in Switzerland
Dependent variable: voter information index (scale from 0 to 3)
Weighted ordered probit
Std. err. adjusted to clustering of obs. in 26 cantons
Variable Coefficient z-value Marginal effect
(average for
all scores)
Extent of political participation rights 0.096** 5.065 0.019
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Table 4 (continuation)
Compulsory education ref. group
Basic vocational training 0.082 0.685 0.016
Vocational training 0.175* 2.638 0.034
Diploma school 0.309** 3.356 0.061
High school 0.550** 5.443 0.107
Higher vocational education 0.526** 7.420 0.102
Higher vocational college 0.487** 4.945 0.095
University degree 0.948** 10.452 0.173
Household income below Sfr. 2,000 ref. group
Household income Sfr. 2,000-3,000 -0.026 -0.255 0.005
Household income Sfr. 3,001-4,000 0.124 1.296 0.024
Household income Sfr. 4,001-5,000 0.022 0.241 0.004
Household income Sfr. 5,001-6,000 0.089 0.755 0.017
Household income Sfr. 6,001-7,000 0.269* 2.534 0.054
Household income Sfr. 7,001-8,000 0.267* 2.075 0.053
Household income Sfr. 8,001-9,000 0.332**  3.307 0.066
Household income Sfr. 9,001-10,000 0.459** 4.998 0.089
Household income Sfr. 10,001-12,000 0.260* 2.321 0.052
Household income more than Sfr. 12,000 0.185 1.456 0.037
Age 0.012(*) 1.970 0.002
Age squared -2.210 e-6 -0.034 -0.000
Sex (1 = male) 0.584** 15.295 0.115
Married ref. group
Living with partner -0.031 -0.324 -0.006
Single 0.141* 2.226 0.028
Divorced -0.186* -2.415 -0.036
Widowed -0.062 -0.752 -0.012
Living in city ref. group
Living in agglomeration -0.075(*) -1.788 -0.015
Living on countryside -0.102* -2.075 -0.020
Size of population in canton (in ‘000s) -0.268 e-3 -1.076 0.000
Size of population squared 0.367 e-6 (*) 2.030 0.000
Naturalized citizen ref. group
Native Swiss citizen 0.361** 4.061 0.070
Member of political party (1 = yes) 0.300** 4.954 0.060
Observations 6449
LR chi2 1’553.8
Prob > chi2 0.0000
Notes: Level of voter information is measured on a three-point scale. White estimator for variance.
Significance levels: (*) 0.05 < p < 0.10, * 0.01 < p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Data source: Selects 1996.
The estimation results in table 4 show statistically significant effects of several
demographic and socio-economic factors and, most importantly, the institutional factor
on voter information. The results can be interpreted as follows: a positive coefficient
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indicates that the probability of being politically better informed increases, compared to
any given level. Thus, citizens are politically better informed in cantons with more
extended direct democratic participation rights, ceteris paribus. For ease of
interpretation, marginal effects are also provided. The last column indicates that an
increase in the index of direct democratic rights by one point raises the probability of a
person being better informed by one index point by 1.9 percentage points. This effect is
in itself sizeable:
(i) When the full range of the institutional variable is considered, i.e. when individuals
in canton Basle Land (with the highest democracy index of 5.69) are compared to
citizens in canton Geneva (with the lowest direct participation rights of 1.75), the
marginal effect of political participation rights on voter information amounts to 7.5
percentage points. The size is comparable to the effect of, for instance, having attended
a diploma school instead of having completed only compulsory education, of being
member of a political party, or of having a household income of 9,000 Sfr. instead of
5,000 Sfr.
(ii) The reported effect is an average over the whole sample, i.e. the institutional factor
is important in an aggregate sense. In comparison, being better educated ‘only’ raises
the information levels of those who have actually got a better education.
Table 4 furthermore indicates that the results for the other variables included are in line
with theoretical predictions. The overall regression thus seems reliable, and the
dependent variable obviously captures more than just random differences in citizens’
information levels. For education and income, we both find positive and statistically
significant effects. Voter information is more or less monotonically increasing in
education, and the size of the marginal effects confirms that education is indeed an
important predictor of information levels. The results for income are similar, although
the marginal effects are smaller and information seems not to monotonically increase in
income. An explanation for this might be that education and income are highly
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correlated. Voter information is also found to be significantly higher when an individual
is a member of a political party, whereby causality for this partial correlation can go in
both directions. Furthermore, it is found that individuals who are born as Swiss citizens
are better informed than those who are naturalized later in life. We get somewhat
ambiguous effects for the martial status variables: singles are relatively best informed,
although they cannot profit from potential economies of scale in information production
that emerge from living with a partner or being married. On the other hand, married
people, and those living with a partner, are better informed than divorced or widowed
individuals. Voter information, furthermore, is found to increase in age and to be higher
for men and for people living in cities. The effect for population size cannot easily be
interpreted because the relation with voter information seems to be u-shaped, with a
minimum around a population of 350,000. However, the linear term of population size
is not significant. An alternative specification (not presented) that only includes the
linear term yields statistically significant positive effects for population size. At the
upper end of the scale, population size seems to have positive effects on voter
information, consistent with an argument of economies of scale in information
production.
5.2. Direction of Causality
Do well informed citizens chose direct democratic institutions? Or, in other words, does
the causality between direct democracy and voters’ competence work in reverse in
Swiss cantons?14 Direct democratic participation possibilities, in the form of referenda
and initiatives in Switzerland, started to develop in the middle of the 19th century. The
adoption of some of the instruments of direct popular participation reflects the spread of
the spirit and ideas behind the American and the French revolutions. Equally important
                                                           
14 A standard test for causality would be the Hausman Test. With a second estimator or an instrumental
variable we could study the effect on citizens’ information about political issues and compare the effect
with our estimations. If the effects would be of similar magnitude we could reject the hypothesis of
Benz and Stutzer: Voter Information
26
were political movements within the citizenry. Citizens fought for direct democratic
instruments to gain political power against arbitrary decisions by parliaments and the
influence of industrial pressure groups on these authorities in the cantons (see e.g. Kölz
1998). This historic perspective suggests that the democratic institutions have not been
struggled for by a particular group of politically well informed citizens. Especially
during the last decades, institutional conditions in Swiss cantons have been quite
stable,15 which suggests that causality mainly runs from direct democratic rights to
political information. However, we also think that an informed electorate fosters
institutions of direct political participation. If citizens are better aware of the scope of
political issues they are probably less disappointed with political outcomes that are
against their interest and are more willing to accept the institutions through which the
outcomes have been generated.
5.3. Sensitivity Analysis for the Swiss Results
In the following, various robustness checks are conducted to analyze the sensitivity of
the findings. The results are summarized in table 5. We report how the coefficient on
the institutional variable is changed when alternative specifications are estimated or
when sample choice is different.
First, we analyze citizens’ information for every question that is included in the index
separately. The results are presented in the specifications (2) to (4) in Table 5. The
reported coefficients indicate that the institutional effect is not driven by a single
question. For two of the three questions, results are positive and significant. For the
                                                                                                                                                                             
reversed causality. However, there is so far no general model that takes institutions of direct democracy
as endogenous and that we could include in our empirical approach.
15 The Spearman rank order correlation of the index for direct democratic rights between 1970 and 1996 is
0.803.
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question on signature requirements for initiatives, however, there is no relationship if
only this single question is considered.16
Second, the basic specification (as presented in table 4) is augmented with two dummy
variables on language group membership, one for French speaking and one for Italian
speaking cititzens. Language group effects are potentially important for two reasons.
There might be cultural differences between the language groups that influence
information demand and supply in the French speaking and Italian speaking parts of
Switzerland. Perhaps more importantly, citizens in the French speaking and Italian
speaking regions often claim that they are overruled by the German speaking majority
in votes on referenda and initiatives. Then, it might be natural that information levels
for these language groups are lower simply because they perceive being informed as not
worthwhile. Language group effects can influence the estimates on the institutional
variable, because the cantons where French and Italian speaking citizens live are, at the
same time, less direct democratic than the German speaking cantons. Including
language group dummies in specification (5) indeed reduces the coefficient of political
participation possibilities on voter information by half (it remains statistically
significant, however). French speaking and especially Italian speaking citizens are
substantially less informed on political issues. This difference can be due to the causes
mentioned above, but it might as well be a result of these citizens actually having lower
political participation rights. The issue of which explanation is correct may not be
disentangled efficiently in the econometric analysis. Note, however, that the
institutional variation among German and French speaking cantons is sufficient to
                                                           
16 This result is puzzling in two ways. First, we have expected that signature requirements are a good
proxy for people’s awareness of political issues. Second, knowledge on signature requirement is
positively related to the index of direct democracy in the replication for 2000. Thus, overall the results for
signature requirement are not conclusive. While there have been discussions in Switzerland to change the
signature requirements at the federal level at several occasions during the late 1990s (e.g. when the
federal constitution was completely revised) any eplanation of the results along these lines would be ad
hoc.
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estimate significant positive effects of political participation possibilities on voter
information.
Third, we exclude all the individuals from the sample who refused to answer at least
one of the three questions on voter information. Thus, only individuals are considered
who answered all questions, be it correctly or incorrectly. A first specification without
language group effects produces results similar to those for the larger sample. The
coefficient on the institutional variable is of the same magnitude and statistical
significance. However, it is reduced somewhat further (to one fourth of the original
effect) when language group effects are included in a second specification, and
statistical significance of the effect falls to the 80% level.
Fourth, we replicate the results with a similar survey conducted after the general
elections in 2000 (“Selects 2000”). The survey in 2000 asked the same questions on
voter information as the 1996 survey, which allows for the construction of an identical
index on voter information, and it contains largely the same control variables. The
regression results indicate that the institutional effect on voter information is very
sensitive to this replication. The coefficient on political participation possibilities is
slightly negative, although not statistically significant. It is difficult to explain this
result, especially as the findings for the 1996 survey seem to be robust. One explanation
might be that for one of the questions (the one on the president of the Federal Council),
correct answers are unusually high in 2000 (84% compared to 75% in 1996). This can
be explained by the exceptional popularity of the then president, Adolf Ogi. Indeed, a
look at the single questions reveals that there is a strong negative effect between direct
democracy and the knowledge of the president of the Federal Council in 2000. For the
other questions on the number of parties in the Federal Council and the number of
signatures required for an initiative, the regressions reveal positive relationships.
Overall, these countervailing effects cancel out, resulting in essentially a zero
relationship between political participation possibilities and overall voter information.
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This leads us to conclude that our main results for the 1996 sample can be considered as
sufficiently reliable.
Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis of the Swiss Results
Dependent variable: voter information
Coefficient
Specification Political
participation
rights
Dummy for
French speaking
region
Dummy for
Italian speaking
region
Sample size
(1) Specification as in table 1 0.096**
(0.018)
– –  6449
(2) Only single question on Federal
Council composition as dependent
variable
0.122**
(0.033)
– – 6449
(3) Only single question on Federal
Council President as dependent
variable
0.114**
(0.018)
– – 6449
(4) Only single question on signature
requirement for initiatives as
dependent variable
-0.003
(0.013)
– – 6449
(5) As in table 1, but with language
group dummies
0.054**
(0.018)
-0.160*
(0.061)
-0.381**
(0.036)
6449
(6) Only individuals who answered
every question
0.099**
(0.022)
– – 4102
(7) As in (6), but with language group
dummies
0.026
(0.019)
-0.271**
(0.063)
-0.635**
(0.041)
4102
(8) Replication with the Selects 2000
survey
-0.028
(0.028)
– – 1772
Notes: The regressions include the same control variables as in table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Regressions are weighted ordered probit. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the cantonal level.
Level of voter information is measured on a three point index. Significance levels: (*) 0.05 < p < 0.10, * 0.01
< p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Data sources: Selects 1996 and 2000.
5.4. Institutional Effects on Discussion Intensity in Swiss Cantons
One transmission channel that leads from extended political participation rights to
higher voter information is the discussion process. Private and public political
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discussion affects voter information levels mainly on the demand side: when citizens
are more frequently involved in political discussions, “having an opinion” and being
informed is transformed partly into a private good. In this subsection, it is empirically
investigated whether political participation possibilities indeed influence discussion
intensity among citizens.
Table 6 presents results from a weighted probit regression that links discussion intensity
to the same explanatory variables as already included in table 4. Discussion intensity is
measured as the individual answers to the question: “Did you discuss with other people
which party or candidates to vote for?”. The answers are coded “yes” or “no”, which
results in a dichotomous dependent variable. Regressions again adjust for clustering of
observations at the cantonal level.
Table 6: Political Participation Possibilities and Discussion Intensity in Switzerland
Dependent variable: discussion intensity
Weighted probit
Std. err. adjusted to clustering of obs. in 26 cantons
Variable Coefficient t-value Marginal effect
Extent of political participation rights 0.143** 4.993 0.053
Compulsory education ref. group
Basic vocational training 0.189 1.150 0.067
Vocational training 0.324* 2.390 0.118
Diploma school 0.537** 3.481 0.174
High school 0.521** 3.607 0.171
Higher vocational education 0.447** 3.265 0.150
Higher vocational college 0.493** 4.852 0.163
University degree 0.393** 3.433 0.134
Household income below Sfr. 2,000 ref. group
Household income Sfr. 2,000-3,000 0.269 1.416 0.094
Household income Sfr. 3,001-4,000 0.339 1.689 0.117
Household income Sfr. 4,001-5,000 0.289(*) 1.712 0.101
Household income Sfr. 5,001-6,000 0.322(*) 1.917 0.112
Household income Sfr. 6,001-7,000 0.290 1.482 0.101
Household income Sfr. 7,001-8,000 0.461* 2.246 0.154
Household income Sfr. 8,001-9,000 0.842**  5.053 0.249
Household income Sfr. 9,001-10,000 0.492* 2.255 0.162
Household income Sfr. 10,001-12,000 0.628** 4.772 0.199
Household income more than Sfr. 12,000 0.695** 3.741 0.215
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Table 6 (continuation)
Age -0.022* -2.476 -0.008
Age squared 0.134 e-3 1.520 0.000
Sex (1 = male) -0.246** -6.200 -0.090
Married ref. group
Living with partner 0.131 1.121 0.040
Single -0.002 -0.026 -0.000
Divorced 0.214 1.380 0.075
Widowed -0.028 -0.256 -0.010
Living in city ref. group
Living in agglomeration 0.011 0.103 0.004
Living on coutryside 0.107 0.840 0.039
Size of population in canton (in ‘000s) 0.407 e-3 1.017 0.0001
Size of population squared -0.163 e-6 -0.487 -0.000
Naturalized citizen ref. group
Native Swiss citizen 0.212** 2.786 0.081
Member of political party (1 = yes) 0.119 1.427 0.043
Observations 4016
LR chi2 350.5
Prob > chi2 0.0000
Notes: Discussion intensity is measured as a dichotomous variable. White estimator for variance.
Significance levels: (*) 0.05 < p < 0.10, * 0.01 < p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Data source: Selects 1996.
Table 6 confirms that the extent of political participation possibilities affects discussion
intensity. Citizens are more involved in political discussions in cantons with more
extended direct democratic participation rights, ceteris paribus. An increase in the index
of direct democratic rights by one point raises the proportion of persons having
discussed the election with other people by 5.3 percentage points. The magnitude of the
effect is sizeable, especially when the full range of institutional variation within
Switzerland is taken into account. Citizens living in the most direct democratic canton
are 21 percentage points more likely to discuss with fellow citizens than people with the
lowest political participation possibilities. The effect is comparable to those of
substantial increases in education and income.
The control variables in general have plausible signs and exert significant influences on
discussion intensity. Education and income are important predictors of discussion
intensity, as is being born as a Swiss citizen. For other control variables, the results are
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more ambiguous. Marital status, population size and place of residence seem not to
affect discussion intensity systematically, although they somewhat affected voters’
information level. For gender being male and age, negative correlations are estimated.
Men and senior citizens thus seem to discuss political issues less with others, but
nevertheless are better informed voters. These are two interesting findings in
themselves. While there is no according prediction from our underlying model, there
seem to be reasonable arguments along which the findings could be further analyzed.
First, it might well be argued that people accumulate political information over their life
while being less and less involved in political discussions. Second, women and men
may use different channels to gather political information. Men, e.g., might use media
more intensively than women to get political information.
We again conduct robustness checks to analyze the sensitivity of the findings on
discussion intensity.
First, the basic specification (as presented in table 6) is augmented with two dummy
variables on language group membership, one for French speaking and one for Italian
speaking citizens. The reasons for this are largely the same as already discussed above:
cultural differences between the language groups might influence discussion intensity in
the French and Italian parts of Switzerland, or it might be lower because these citizens
feel they are often overruled by the German speaking majority and are thus less
interested in national politics. The estimated effect for the institutional variable is
indeed sensitive to the inclusion of language group differences. The coefficient falls to
0.01 (t=0.299), whereas French speaking (coeff.=-0.518, t=-4.189) and Italian speaking
citizens (coeff.=-0.236, t=-4.966) discuss political issues substantially less with their
fellow citizens. Due to the low variation within the French speaking cantons in the
extent of political participation rights, it is again not possible to empirically distinguish
in conclusion whether this is the case because these citizens actually have lower
political participation rights, or whether this just reflects cultural differences. Both
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explanations might be correct. We have to conclude that the institutional effect on
discussion intensity is not reliable enough to make clear statements. As the question on
discussion intensity was not asked in the 2000 survey, we cannot replicate the findings
using the survey conducted after the 2000 elections.
6 Conclusions
This paper empirically tests the theoretically well founded notion that voters are better
informed when they have a larger say in the political process. Using survey data from
the EU and Switzerland, we find supportive evidence for this prediction. Voter
information is to a substantial degree endogenous to the political institutions under
which citizens live.
Referenda on the Maastricht Treaty and on Joining the EU have substantially increased
citizens factual information about the EU as well as their subjectively perceived level of
information. The size of the estimated effect of a referendum in the EU on “objective”
information is comparable to the difference in political information between an
individual in a middle income category and an individual in the lowest income category.
In Switzerland, larger direct participation possibilities result in higher information
levels. Comparing the size of the effects, we find that the influence of more political
participation possibilities is substantial: the range is comparable to an increase in
education from just compulsory education to having attended a diploma school, or an
increase in household income from 5000 SFr. to 9000 SFr. Various sensitivity checks
support the general result. However, the institutional effect of extended participation
possibilities on voter information is found to be sensitive to replication with a similar,
although much smaller, survey conducted in 2000. An empirical explanation for the
difference in results is provided.
Apart from the institutional variables, the regressions include several other control
variables that political economists have identified as important determinants of voter
information, e.g. education, income or party membership. For these control variables,
we find significant effects with the expected signs, indicating that our dependent
variable captures more than just random differences in voter information. Looking at the
joint findings for the EU and Switzerland, we believe that our study presents for the first
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time systematic empirical evidence that voters are better informed when they have a
larger say in politics. The findings complement the theoretical arguments and the
circumstancial evidence previously advanced in the literature.
The findings have important policy consequences. If voter information is to be
increased (a claim that is regularly heard), governments and policy advisors often focus
on information campaigns on specific issues they themselves find important. However,
information campaigns often only provide superficial information and consist of one-
way communication, thus hardly leading to long term increases in voter information
levels. Our results point to an institutional alternative. Higher voter information might
be achieved by giving citizens more direct participation possibilities.
We also investigate whether political discussion intensity among citizens should be
treated as endogenously determined by political institutions. Private and public
discussions about political issues are presumed to be a major transmission mechanism
for the effect of direct democratic institutions on voter information. First findings seem
to support the hypothesis. However, the empirical results are sensitive to the inclusion
of differences between the three large Swiss language regions over and above the
institutional variation. While further research is needed, current evidence suggests that a
promising remedy for an often claimed voter alienation and apathy in politics could be
seen in giving citizens more political participation rights.
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